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COMMENT
SYSTEMIC RACISM IN CHILD NEGLECT LAWS
Kendra Kumor*
The American child protection and support system was founded in the
Reconstruction era. After the Civil War, many Southern states passed socalled Black Codes, which included apprenticeship statutes. These
apprenticeship statutes allowed children to be removed from their parents’
care for any number of reasons, including poor moral character or financial
instability. Although these statutes have long since been repealed, the
residual institutional effects still linger in today’s child neglect and custody
battles. Black children are disproportionately represented in child protective
services investigations, in part because Black families constitute a
disproportionate part of the homeless and impoverished population in the
United States. Currently, some states’ legal definitions for child neglect
simply track the expected conditions of poverty. This Comment argues child
neglect should be defined more narrowly to avoid the arbitrary removal of
Black children from their families. This Comment also argues that child
protection professionals should take into account the wider environmental
conditions Black families face, which are often the result of community
neglect, as opposed to parental neglect.
INTRODUCTION
My first client as a family defense lawyer was a Black mother who left her
13-year-old in charge of 8- and 6-year-old siblings while she went to the
dry cleaners. In suburban America, we call this babysitting. In a
predominately Black, public housing complex in Washington, D.C., this
constituted neglect.
—Vivek Sankaran1

Black children constitute 14 percent of the total child population in the
United States today.2 However, Black children represent 23 percent of the
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2016, Boston College.
1. Vivek Sankaran, With Child Welfare, Racism Is Hiding in the Discretion, IMPRINT
(June 21, 2020, 11:00 PM), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/with-child-welfareracism-is-hiding-in-the-discretion/44616 [https://perma.cc/8F4L-F4JQ] (emphasis omitted).
2. Black Children Continue to Be Disproportionately Represented in Foster Care, KIDS
COUNT DATA CTR. (Apr. 13, 2020), https://datacenter.kidscount.org/updates/show/264-usfoster-care-population-by-race-and-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/XDP7-SXNH].
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total population in the child welfare system.3 Of the 37.4 percent of U.S.
children who are the subject of a child protective services investigation
before their eighteenth birthdays, 53 percent of those children are Black.4
The disproportionate representation of Black children in the child protection
system can be traced back to the Reconstruction era, when apprenticeship
statutes afforded local law enforcement officers and judges broad discretion
to take Black children away from their families.5 Today, many state child
neglect statutes still allow social workers and judges much discretion to
decide what constitutes child neglect.6 This Comment argues that many
states’ child neglect statutes remain too broad, contributing to the high
disproportionality rates of Black children in the child welfare system.7 State
legislatures should adopt a uniform, narrow definition of child neglect to help
reduce racial bias in child neglect determinations and account for the
community neglect that many Black families face today.8
I. HISTORY OF THE U.S. CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM
The American child protection system is rooted in the aftermath of the
Civil War. Part I.A outlines the so-called Black Codes, which contained
certain child protection provisions that effectively reenslaved Black children.
Part I.B illustrates how the child apprentice system evolved during the
Second Industrial Revolution and continued to disproportionately impact
Black children and their families.
A. Reconstruction Era: Black Codes
After the Civil War, many Southern states passed Black Codes9 which
included apprenticeship statutes.10 These statutes created a duty for all civil
officers to report free Black children under the age of eighteen “who are
orphans, or whose parent or parents have not the means, or who refuse to
provide for and support said minors, and thereupon it shall be the duty of said
probate court . . . to apprentice said minors to some competent or suitable
person.”11 Children could be taken away from their parents for any number
of reasons including vagrancy, “poor moral character,” financial instability,

3. Id.
4. Hyunil Kim et al., Lifetime Prevalence of Investigating Child Maltreatment Among
U.S. Children, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 274, 274 (2017).
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See 2 EDWARD MCPHERSON, POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 29–44 (surveying statutes from Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia).
10. Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and
Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1143 (1999).
11. MCPHERSON, supra note 9, at 29 (citing a Mississippi statute).
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and industrial incompetency.12 Predictably, white parents were not held to
these same standards.13 Under these laws, Black parents’ custody became
conditional on their perceived parental competency.14 If their parental
competency was questioned, it became the parents’ burden to prove they had
sufficient moral character or industriousness to satisfy the court or authority
ordering the seizure of their children.15 Given the prejudice of white judges
and law enforcement personnel, convincing these authorities of sufficient
parental competency and ability was a nearly impossible task.16
Additionally, recently freed Black Americans, without the means to afford
legal counsel, were almost always unrepresented.17 Child custody litigation
also involved a complex interplay between labor law, constitutional
challenges, state law statutory interpretation, and habeas corpus petitions.18
Courts often ruled against Black parents on technicalities—which would
have been easily avoidable with access to trained legal counsel.19 Even if
Black parents could afford an attorney, the legal precedent for obtaining child
custody did not favor them.20 Authorities could essentially interpret and
apply the apprenticeship statutes at will, creating a system that could deprive
virtually any Black parent of their child custody rights.21
The drafters of these apprenticeship statutes justified them as a means to
“provide[] protection and safe governance for . . . people unfit to . . . provide
suitably for their children.”22 Although these statutes claimed to protect the
interests of disadvantaged or orphaned children, the laws had the opposite
effect because they essentially reinstated slavery for Black children.23 For
example, in Maryland alone, it is estimated that 90,000 slaves were freed
after emancipation, but approximately 10,000 were reenslaved under
apprenticeship statutes.24 Within a month of emancipation, Maryland courts
had apprenticed more than 2500 Black children, mostly to their former
masters.25 It was reported that children were carried to the local courts in
wagons and carriages to be placed in the apprenticeship system.26
Additionally, politicians used these statutes to trim budgets by taking poor
12. Peggy Cooper Davis, “So Tall Within”—the Legacy of Sojourner Truth, 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 451, 464 (1996).
13. Laura F. Edwards, “The Marriage Covenant Is at the Foundation of All Our Rights”:
The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina After Emancipation, 14 LAW & HIST. REV.
81, 97 (1996).
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. James D. Schmidt, “Free Labor Still Lives”: African-American Uses of Labor Law
in the Reconstruction South, 1864–1868, 3 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 37, 49 (1994).
18. See id. at 52.
19. See id. at 59.
20. Id. at 49.
21. See Edwards, supra note 13, at 97.
22. Davis, supra note 12, at 460.
23. Hansen, supra note 10, at 1143.
24. Davis, supra note 12, at 457.
25. See id. at 457 n.40.
26. See id.
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children away from their homes and placing them with individuals who could
provide for them without relying on government assistance.27 Overall, the
myth of white parental supremacy and paternalism in the post-emancipation
years rationalized the South’s apprenticeship statutes.28
B. Second Industrial Revolution: Poor Laws
By the early 1870s, courts had overturned most apprenticeship statutes
instituted by the Black Codes using the Thirteenth Amendment29 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.30 However, Black children were still subjected to
apprenticeship systems either voluntarily by their parents, who hoped their
children would learn a trade, or involuntarily under state poor laws well into
the twentieth century.31 Poor laws were originally instituted in the colonial
era to ensure that towns and provinces would provide for impoverished
children and adults.32 Although poor laws were conceived with charitable
intentions, they no longer reflected these intentions by the twentieth
century.33 The apprenticeship system was used exclusively for cheap child
labor—in the form of household workers, farm hands, and factory laborers.34
Towns and states with poor laws were happy to continue the apprenticeship
system; the system allowed them to “provide for” poor children as cheaply
as possible since the children’s own labor, rather than government funds, paid
for their room and board.35
During the Great Depression, the apprenticeship system, under the guise
of the poor laws, continued to deprive poor parents of child custody.36
“Orphan trains” transported over 200,000 poor children from inner cities to
farm families in the Midwest.37 Politicians justified this movement by
assuring that children in rural America would learn the trade of a hired farm
hand and stay off of the dangerous streets of the inner cities.38 This system
perpetuated the breakup of poor families by creating a cycle of poverty and
a dearth of public resources for poor parents.39 Even if poor parents were
able to improve their economic prospects, society still viewed them as
immoral and unfit to regain custody of their children.40

27. Janet L. Dolgin, Transforming Childhood: Apprenticeship in American Law, 31 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1997).
28. See Davis, supra note 12, at 460.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
30. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1992); Schmidt, supra
note 17, at 58.
31. See Dolgin, supra note 27, at 1127.
32. See id. at 1176.
33. See id. at 1174.
34. Id. at 1177.
35. Id.
36. See Jessica Dixon Weaver, Beyond Child Welfare—Theories on Child Homelessness,
21 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 17, 26–27 (2014).
37. See id. at 27.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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To this day, children removed from their families due to poverty or
homelessness often cannot be reunited with their families because their
parents cannot secure public assistance from the government.41 As such, the
law continues to deprive poor families of the same protection of their child
custody rights as is afforded middle-class families.42 Black Americans make
up a disproportionate percentage of both the impoverished and homeless
population and the foster care system.43 This is a product of the fact that race
and poverty have been legally intertwined in the United States since its
founding.44 Reconstruction-era laws enacted and upheld well into the
twentieth century continue to perpetuate this inequality.45
II. DEFINING CHILD NEGLECT
While Part I focused on the historical evolution of American child
protection laws, Part II focuses on the current status of the law—particularly,
how state law defines child neglect.46 Most states define neglect as some
failure of a person responsible for a child to provide food, shelter, clothing,
medical care, or supervision.47 This Comment separates state child neglect
definitions into two categories. Part II.A discusses broad statutory
definitions of child neglect, while Part II.B discusses narrow statutory
definitions.
A. Broad Definitions of Child Neglect
Defining child neglect is a notoriously difficult endeavor.48 The debate
over the definition implicates questions about minimum standards of care,
action and inaction, and intentionality.49 Some states’ child neglect statutes
employ a broad definition of child neglect, allowing for more discretion on
the part of the social workers and judges who must apply and interpret this
statutory definition.50 For example, several states include in the definition of
child neglect situations where a child may be put at risk but is not actually
41. Id. at 29–30.
42. See id. at 31.
43. See id. at 32.
44. See id. at 32–33.
45. See id. at 33.
46. Although the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act also provides a federal
definition for child neglect, this piece will focus on variations in state law. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106.
47. See Acts of Omission: An Overview of Child Neglect, BULL. FOR PROS. (Child.’s
Bureau,
Washington,
D.C.),
July
2018,
at
1–2,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/acts.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V6F-AKL5].
48. See DIANE DEPANFILIS, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD NEGLECT: A
GUIDE FOR PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 9–10 (2006),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/neglect.pdf [https://perma.cc/86T5-L73X].
49. Id.
50. See Stephanie Ann Stowman, Relevance of Age and Special Needs in Initial
Development Phases of a Child Neglect Scale 8 (Nov. 15, 2005) (M.A. thesis, University of
Nevada,
Las
Vegas),
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2911&context=rtds
[https://perma.cc/E9YV-XHQH].
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harmed. Florida’s statute defines neglect as when “a child is permitted to
live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or
to be in danger of being significantly impaired.”51 California’s statute
requires a finding of neglect when a “child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness.”52
These types of broad statutory definitions are meant to allow social workers
to be proactive instead of reactive.
Another example of a broad statutory definition of child neglect includes
the “prudent parent” standard.53 For example, Colorado’s statute states that
child neglect includes “[a]ny case in which a child is a child in need of
services because the child’s parents . . . fail[] to take . . . actions to provide
adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision that a prudent
parent would take.”54 Iowa has a similar standard, describing neglect as a
“failure to provide for the adequate supervision of a child . . . that a
reasonable and prudent person would exercise under similar facts and
circumstances.”55 Tennessee even provides that a person may be deemed an
“unfit” caretaker by reason of “immorality.”56 These types of statutes allow
for broad discretion, as any given social worker or judge may have a different
idea of how a prudent or moral parent should act in a specific set of
circumstances.57
Finally, some statutory definitions of child neglect are so broad as to
encompass deliberate and negligent acts or omissions as well as one’s simple
inability to provide for a child. For example, Indiana’s statute states child
neglect occurs when a “child’s physical or mental condition is seriously
impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian” to provide for the
child.58 Similarly, Idaho defines a neglected child as one whose “parents,
guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge their responsibilities to
and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child lacks the parental
care necessary for his or her health, safety or well-being.”59 It is important
to note neither Indiana nor Idaho supplies an exception for financial inability
to provide for a child in their statutory definitions.60
Overall, these types of broad statutes have advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, broad statutory language allows social workers and judges
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (2021) (emphasis added).
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b)(1) (West 2021) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (2021).
Id. § 19-1-103(1)(a)(III).
IOWA CODE § 232.68(4)(b) (2021).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(13)(B) (2021).
See Peter H. Rossi et al., Understanding Decisions About Child Maltreatment, 23
EVALUATION REV. 579, 594–95 (1999) (finding that child welfare experts disagreed nearly 50
percent of the time when given a hypothetical about whether a situation constituted child
neglect or maltreatment).
58. IND. CODE § 31-34-1-1(1) (2021) (emphasis added).
59. IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(31)(b) (2021) (emphasis added).
60. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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to be flexible in deciding child neglect cases based on individualized facts
and local community standards.61 Broad language also allows social workers
to intervene preventively before harm actually occurs when there is a
“substantial risk,” instead of reactively addressing the situation after the harm
has already occurred.62 On the other hand, broad definitions have been
criticized for “imposing middle-class values as interpreted by professionals
on lower class families” without consideration of cultural differences.63 In
some cases, parents can be charged with neglect simply for living in a certain
area or building because a social worker considers these circumstances to
constitute an inability to care for the child.64 Narrowing the definition of
child neglect could help eliminate court intervention based on value
judgments about family lifestyles or subjective determinations about
cleanliness or care.65 Additionally, broad definitions have the potential to
overload a strained child welfare system with a wide variety of neglect
cases.66
B. Narrow Definitions of Child Neglect
In contrast to the broad definitions above, some states have implemented
narrow statutory definitions of child neglect that afford less discretion to
social workers and judges applying the standard in practice. One way that
states have narrowed their definitions of child neglect is to provide an
exception for financial inability—meaning that financial inability alone
cannot constitute child neglect.67 Twelve states and the District of Columbia
provide a separate statutory exception for financial inability to provide for a
child.68 Other states embed the financial inability exception into their actual
statutory definitions. For example, Michigan defines child neglect as failing
to provide for the child “though financially able to do so.”69 Similarly, New
Hampshire’s definition lists several acts and omissions and concludes with a
61. See Stowman, supra note 50, at 9.
62. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
63. See Stowman, supra note 50, at 9; see also Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or
Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV.
577, 584 n.35 (1997) (stating that the majority of child services professionals, judges,
caseworkers, and lawyers who handle child neglect cases are white).
64. Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2295 (1998).
65. Judith Areen, Intervention Between the Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State’s
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 918–19 (1975).
66. See Stowman, supra note 50, at 9; see also Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of “Neglected” Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1015
(1975) (noting that subjective determinations and projections about future harm could lead to
overreporting).
67. Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect, STATE STATUTES (Child.’s Bureau,
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2019, at 1, 4, https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CD56-BNGK].
68. Those twelve states are Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Id. at 4 n.26.
69. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.622(k)(i) (2021).
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carveout: “and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial
means of the parents, guardian, or custodian.”70
Another way that some states have narrowed their definitions is to provide
an enumerated list of specific circumstances constituting child neglect. For
example, Arkansas provides a list of ten different situations that constitute
child neglect, thus limiting the statutory definition to specific failures or
refusals to provide care while having the means to do so.71 Similarly, Texas
confines its statutory definition to a list of specified “acts or omissions by a
person” responsible for a child’s care.72 These types of statutes can provide
more specific guidance for social workers and judges applying these
standards in practice.
As with broad statutory constructions of child neglect, narrow definitions
have advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, narrower definitions
provide less room for implicit racial and socioeconomic biases to influence
social workers’ and judges’ decision-making processes.73 Narrower
definitions can also help ensure that child neglect reporting focuses on the
fitness of the parents and not their economic status.74 Statutory exceptions
for financial inability, for example, can help prevent unnecessary state
intervention which can sometimes do more harm than good.75 On the other
hand, narrow statutory language could restrict social workers’ ability to
intervene preemptively before a child is physically harmed. Imposing overly
specific conditions on caretakers can result in an “unacceptable degree of
state intrusion into family life” and an infringement on family autonomy.76
Additionally, no matter how narrowly a definition is written, social workers
will inevitably vary in their determinations because these types of evaluations
are based on individual interpretation through observation and experience.77
III. REDEFINING CHILD NEGLECT
To avoid the continuation of systemic racial discrimination in the
American child protection system, state legislatures should adopt a uniform,
70. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX)(b) (2021).
71. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(14)(A) (2021).
72. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(4)(A)(ii) (West 2021) (listing five situations that
constitute child neglect).
73. See Areen, supra note 65, at 918–19.
74. See Bailie, supra note 64, at 2287.
75. See Wald, supra note 66, at 1021–22 (noting that separating parents from children due
to a finding of child neglect can just perpetuate the very “culture of poverty” social workers
are trying to break).
76. Areen, supra note 65, at 893.
77. Mohammed Nabeel Chaudhry, The Identification of Child Neglect in Social Work
Practice
15
(2016)
(D.
Prof.
dissertation,
University
of
Salford),
https://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/41619/3/THE%20IDENTIFICATION%20OF%20CHILD
%20NEGLECT%20IN%20SOCIAL%20WORK%20PRACTICE.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TM9G-DWWW]; see also Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor
Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519,
533 (1996) (noting that even when there are statutory safeguards that excuse parents who are
unable to provide for their children through no fault of their own, the distinction is not always
made in practice).
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narrow statutory definition of child neglect. Like the Black Codes that were
so easily manipulated by authorities to arbitrarily remove Black children
from their families,78 broad statutory definitions of child neglect allow for
more discretion and thus more room for social workers’ and judges’ explicit
or implicit racial bias. This Comment argues for one uniform, narrow
definition of child neglect and encourages social workers and judges to
account for the larger issue of community neglect that so many Black
families face.
A. Toward a Uniform, Narrow Definition
It is important to continually refine the definition of child neglect so that
different child services agencies, researchers, attorneys, and policymakers
can formulate a unified plan to better address the issue of child neglect.79
Empirical studies show that broad definitions of neglect can lead to greater
rates of disproportionality for Black children in the child welfare system. A
disproportionality rate indicates the level at which certain groups of children
are present in the child welfare system as compared to the general
population.80
States like California and Florida, which have
disproportionality rates of 3.1 and 2.2 respectively,81 employ definitions of
child neglect that include risk or danger of harm.82 Additionally, states that
use a more nebulous “prudent parent” standard—like Colorado and Iowa,83
which have disproportionality rates of 2.5 and 3.5 respectively,84—may also
allow more room for explicit or implicit bias to taint child welfare decisions.
In comparison, of the twelve states that include in their child neglect
definition an explicit statutory exception for financial inability to provide for
the child,85 seven have disproportionality rates at or below the national
average of 1.7,86 and ten have reduced their disproportionately rates for Black
children since 2000.87 Additionally, states like New Hampshire and Texas
that use an enumerated list of specific acts or omissions that constitute child
neglect88 have disproportionality rates at or below the national average and
have also reduced their disproportionality rates since 2000.89
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. See Shannon Tyler et al., Child Neglect: Developmental Consequences, Intervention,
and Policy Implications, 35 CHILD & YOUTH CARE F. 1, 4 (2006).
80. SHAMINI GANASARAJAH ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES,
DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR IN FOSTER CARE 3 n.1 (2017),
https://www.ncjfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/NCJFCJ-Disproportionality-TAB2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4RV-VK8X]. For example, in California, Black children were
disproportionately represented in the child welfare system at a rate of 3.1 times their rate in
the overall child population. See id. at 3.
81. See id. at 5.
82. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
84. GANASARAJAH ET AL., supra note 81, at 5.
85. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
86. See GANASARAJAH ET AL., supra note 81, at 5–6.
87. See id.
88. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
89. See GANASARAJAH ET AL., supra note 81, at 5–6.
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These statistics show that narrow statutory definitions of child neglect can
help temper racial disproportionality in the child protection system.
Although broader language to allow for intervention on a finding of
“substantial risk” of child neglect may be helpful in some circumstances,
social workers should be constrained in taking preemptive measures and be
conscious of cultural biases that can be imparted into such arbitrary statutory
terms.90 For instance, statutory language that allows for a finding of child
neglect for parental “immorality”91 is wholly inappropriate because it mirrors
statutory language from the Reconstruction era that allowed excessive
discretion on the part of social workers and judges enforcing and applying
these laws.92
Perhaps the most important step in curbing disproportionality rates is
amending the definition of child neglect to eliminate poverty or financial
inability as grounds for a finding of child neglect.93 Since Black families
make up a disproportionate amount of the impoverished population in the
United States,94 statutory definitions that allow for a finding of child neglect
based on financial inability alone will continue to fuel the overrepresentation
of Black children in the child protection system.
B. Accounting for Community Neglect
Although narrowing the definition of child neglect to reduce the potential
for racial bias in child neglect investigations and proceedings is important, it
is unlikely to solve the disproportionality issue entirely. One reason why
Black children are disproportionately represented in the child welfare system
is the environmental conditions that many Black families face today. Black
children are three times more likely to live in poverty than their white
counterparts.95 Accordingly, Black families are less likely to have access to
high-quality housing, education, or community resources. Thus, instead of
emphasizing the failures of individual caretakers, the application of child
neglect standards should take into account “community child neglect.”96
A community as a whole can perpetuate child neglect “when it fails to
provide adequate housing, adequate levels of public assistance, adequate
schooling, adequate health services, or adequate recreational services.”97
Reconceptualizing child neglect in this ecological framework highlights the
structural causes of child neglect which include unemployment and
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See Stowman, supra note 50, at 9.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES:
50-YEAR TRENDS AND SAFETY NET IMPACTS 26 (2016),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/154286/50YearTrends.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9RMEGLE] (stating that 26.2 percent of all Black Americans live in poverty, while only 10.1
percent of all white Americans live in poverty).
95. Council on Cmty. Pediatrics, Poverty and Child Health in the United States,
PEDIATRICS, Apr. 2016, at 1, 2.
96. RUTH LAWRENCE & PENELOPE IRVINE, REDEFINING FATAL CHILD NEGLECT 1, 9 (2004).
97. Chaudhry, supra note 77, at 77.
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poverty.98 This definition also helps to explain why community financial
weakness is an important indicator of which communities are at risk for
higher levels of child neglect.99 Accounting for community neglect would
help to focus efforts on community assets and resources. This accounting
would combine the top-down approach of narrowing statutory definitions of
child neglect and the bottom-up community-driven approach of recognizing
environmental factors that contribute to child neglect.100
Acknowledging community child neglect is now more important than
ever, as the COVID-19 pandemic “has the potential to exacerbate existing
inequities . . . especially in light of the evidence that financial hardship
negatively impacts the risk of child neglect.”101 Historically, declining
financial conditions have been correlated with increases in child neglect
cases.102 It is clear that Black families are being disproportionately affected
by the pandemic.103 Thus, ensuring that Black families have access to
financial resources and community support, instead of unnecessarily
subjecting parents to the scrutiny and disruption of a child neglect
investigation, can help reduce the disparities in the child protection
system.104
CONCLUSION
Although the Black Codes and apprenticeship statutes on which the
American child protection system was founded have long been repealed,
residual systemic racial bias remains. Today, Black children are still
disproportionately represented in child protective services investigations, in
part because Black families disproportionately represent the homeless and
impoverished population of the United States. State legislatures can help to
reduce disproportionality rates by enacting narrow definitions of child
neglect. Especially important are statutory exceptions for financial inability
to provide for a child. The child protection system should also consider
community neglect to account for the structural and environmental causes of
child neglect. Through these measures, the American child protection system
can begin to rid itself of the racial bias that still pervades it today.
98. LAWRENCE & IRVINE, supra note 96, at 9.
99. Chaudhry, supra note 77, at 77.
100. See Michael G. Wessells, Bottom-Up Approaches to Strengthening Child Protection
Systems: Placing Children, Families, and Communities at the Center, 43 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 8, 8 (2015).
101. Kamia Rathore et al., Recommendations to Address the Inequitable Impacts of
COVID-19 in Child Welfare, Housing, and Community Capacity, CHAPIN HALL ISSUE BRIEF
(Chapin Hall at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.), Sept. 2020, at 1, 2,
https://www.chapinhall.org/wp-content/uploads/Inequitable-impacts-of-COVID-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NS3G-Y9AM].
102. See id. (noting that several studies of the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 show
correlations between periods of economic hardship and increased child neglect).
103. See id. at 1; see also Kelly Glass, Black Families Were Hit Hard by the Pandemic.
The Effects on Children May Be Lasting., N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/parenting/coronavirus-black-children-inequality.html
[https://perma.cc/69EG-E5FF].
104. See Rathore et al., supra note 101, at 3.

